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                                UNITED STATES of America  
                                           v.  
                             Ceverilo CHAMBERS, Appellant  
 
                                      No. 97-5501.  
 
                               United States Court of Appeals,  
                                      Third Circuit.  
 
                     Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) Nov. 20, 
1998  
 
                                    Filed Sept. 13, 1999  
 
 On Appeal From the United States District Court For the District of New 
Jersey. (D.C. Criminal No.94-cr-00585-3) District Judge: Honorable 
Nicholas H. Politan. 
 
Ceverilo Chambers Pro se Appellant.  
 
George S. Leone, Esq., Perry Carbone, Esq., Office of United States 
Attorney, Newark, NJ, Attorneys for Appellee.  
 
Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges  
 
                                OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.  
 
We are asked to determine whether appellant's motion for return of 
property filed pursuant to Rule 41(e), Fed.R.Crim.P., is moot because the 
government no longer possesses the property that was seized at the time of 
appellant's arrest. We hold that a motion for return of property does not 
become moot merely because the government no longer retains the seized 
property. We further conclude that the District Court should have taken 
evidence to determine whether the government properly disposed of 
appellant's property. Accordingly, we will 
vacate the order of the District Court denying appellant's motion and will 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
                                           I. 
 
Ceverilo Chambers pled guilty to drug related offenses on February 28, 
1995, and was sentenced to a term of 62 months imprisonment. His 
conviction was affirmed by this Court on January 31, 1997. On June 10, 
1997, after criminal proceedings had ended, Chambers filed a motion for 
the return of property seized by the government when he was arrested. 
Specifically, he requested the return of a 1987 Road Ranger and a 1993 
Toyota Corolla, as well as company records, keys, and a wallet.  
 
In its response to the motion, the government asserted that the motion was 
moot because it no longer retained the property sought by Chambers. On 
July 23, 1997, the District Court denied Chambers' motion because it 
concluded that there was no property to be returned. Relying upon the 
government's assertions, the District Court stated that the 1987 Road 
Ranger had been forfeited, that the 1993 Toyota Corolla had been released 
to a repossession company, that the papers had been destroyed, and that 
the keys and the wallet had been returned to 
Chambers' girlfriend, at his request.  
 
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Chambers filed a timely notice of 
appeal from the denial of his motion for return of property. The appeal 
initially was referred to a panel of this Court for a determination 
whether the appeal should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 
The panel declined to dismiss the appeal as frivolous. Instead, the Court 
directed the government to submit documentation to support any statements 
regarding the 
disposition of Chambers' property.  
 
On appeal, the government argues that the District Court properly 
dismissed Chambers' motion for return of property because there was no 
longer any property to return. The government has provided documents 
indicating that the 1987 Road Ranger was administratively forfeited on 
April 14, 1995,1 that the 1993 Toyota was released to a repossession 
company, apparently on December 19, 1994,2 and that the papers were 
destroyed on May 15, 1996. Chambers requests that we direct the District 
Court to conduct fact-finding regarding the disposition of his 
property.  
_____________________________________________________________  
1. The government also provided a document regarding a 1984 Trailer that 
was forfeited on January 27, 1995. Chambers does not raise any issues with 
respect to this vehicle, and we, therefore, will not consider it.  
 
2. Although the government states that the Toyota Corolla was released to 
the repossession company on December 19, 1994, we note that the document 
submitted in support of that statement contains two dates. The document 
contains the following printed and typewritten statement: "Executed in 
triplicate this 19th day of Dec. 1995." However, the dates handwritten 
next to each of the 
signatures of the parties who executed the Hold Harmless Agreement is "12-
19-94." If material, the District Court may resolve this factual question 
upon remand.  
_____________________________________________________________  
 
                                           II. 
 
Before we turn to the merits of the appeal, we must address the threshold 
question of jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 
523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). It is well 
settled that the 
government is permitted to seize evidence for use in investigation and 
trial, but that such property must be returned once criminal proceedings 
have concluded, unless it is contraband or subject to forfeiture. See 
United States v. 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, 584 F.2d 1297, 1302 (3d 
Cir.1978); see also United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1103 
(D.C.Cir.1976) (District Court has both the jurisdiction and duty to 
return property against which no government claim lies). A person 
aggrieved by the deprivation of property may file a motion under Rule 
41(e), Fed.R.Crim.P.,3 to request the return of that property. Government 
of Virgin Islands v. Edwards, 903 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir.1990). A District 
Court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for return of property made 
after the termination of criminal proceedings against the defendant; such 
an action is treated as a civil proceeding for equitable relief. See 
United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir.1987); Rufu v. United 
States, 20 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.1994); Thompson v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974, 975 
(8th Cir.1995). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review the District Court's decision to exercise its equitable 
jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. 
See Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir.1993).  
___________________________________________________  
3. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) reads:  
 
     Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful 
search  
and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court 
for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the 
property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession 
of the property. The court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact 
necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the 
property shall be returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions 
may be imposed to protect access and use of the property in subsequent 
proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on for 
hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is 
filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12. 
_____________________________________________________  
 
                                          III. 
 
The government asserts that it is obvious that in order for a District 
Court to grant a motion for return of property there must be something to 
return. This argument might succeed if the government had never had actual 
or constructive possession of the property at issue. See, e.g., United 
States v. Solis, 108 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.1997).  
 
However, that is not the case here. In essence, the government argues that 
Chambers' motion under Rule 41(e) is moot because the government no longer 
has anything to return.4  Such an argument has been rejected uniformly by 
the Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Kanasco, Ltd., 123 F.3d 
209, 210 n. 1 (4th Cir.1997); Thompson v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974, 975 (8th 
Cir.1995) (per curiam); Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 160 (2d 
Cir.1992); Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1368; United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 
251, 262-63 (6th Cir.1981); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United 
States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir.1978).  
 
In Mora, the District Court had denied a prisoner's motion for return of 
property on the ground that it could not direct the government to return 
property that it no longer had. 955 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.1992). In holding 
that the 
motion for return of property was not moot, the Court of Appeals 
explained:  
 
     when the government gives away, loses or destroys a prisoner's 
property, such unilateral conduct on the government's part does not ... 
deprive the court ... of its jurisdiction. Rather, when a court has 
asserted its equitable jurisdiction over a matter, it retains that 
jurisdiction so long as necessary  
to afford appropriate relief to the movant. 
 
955 F.2d at 160.  
 
We agree and join those Courts that have held that a motion for return of 
property is not rendered moot merely because the government no longer 
possesses the seized property.  
 
Although this Court has not addressed the precise question presented here, 
we find support for our conclusion in our decision in United States v. 
Frank, 763 F.2d 551, 552 (3d Cir.1985). There, we reversed the District 
Court's order holding that it did not have jurisdiction to determine who 
was entitled to property sought through a motion for return of property.5  
We rejected the government's argument that the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to 
return the property because the check at issue had been converted to cash 
proceeds and placed in funds in the Treasury, explaining that, "[t]he IRS, 
merely by converting the form of evidence, may not frustrate the district 
court's authority to control the disposition of evidence in a criminal 
prosecution." Id. at 553. Likewise, the government can not defeat a 
properly filed motion for return of property merely by stating that it has 
destroyed the 
property or given the property to third parties.  
_______________________________________________________  
4. The concept of mootness as applied herein relates to the "mooting" of 
jurisdiction by virtue of lack of possession of the property in question. 
See United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir.1987).  
 
5. In Frank, defendant's business partners filed a motion for return of a 




We now turn to the second question presented in this matter: which party 
bears the evidentiary burden when a motion for return of property is made 
after the termination of criminal proceedings? Specifically, we must 
decide whether the District Court properly denied Chambers' motion solely 
on the strength of the government's representations that the property had 
been transferred to third parties, destroyed or forfeited.  
 
If a motion for return of property is made while a criminal prosecution is 
pending, the burden is on the movant to show that he or she is entitled to 
the property. Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. "Generally, a Rule 41(e) motion 
is 
properly denied 'if the defendant is not entitled to lawful possession of 
the seized property, the property is contraband or subject to forfeiture 
or the government's need for the property as evidence continues.' " United 
States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir.1991). The burden 
shifts to the government when the criminal proceedings have terminated. 
Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. At that point, the person from whom the 
property was seized is presumed to have a right to its return, and the 
government must demonstrate that it has a legitimate reason to retain the 
property. Id.; see also Edwards, 903 F.2d at 274 (after termination of 
criminal 
proceedings, the government must show "that it had a legitimate reason not 
to return the property to the person from whom it was seized"). The 
government may meet this burden by demonstrating "a cognizable claim of 
ownership or right to possession" adverse to that of the movant. Van 
Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d at 1061. The government must do more than state, 
without documentary support, that it no longer possesses the property at 
issue. See Mora, 955 F.2d at 159.  
 
If, as in this case, the government asserts that it no longer has the 
property sought, the District Court must determine, in fact, whether the 
government retains possession of the property; if it finds that the 
government no longer possesses the property, the District Court must 
determine what happened to the property. Id. The District Court must hold 
an evidentiary hearing on any disputed issue of fact necessary to the 
resolution of the motion. See United States v. Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 21 (5th 
Cir.1996); United States v. Hess, 982 F.2d 181, 186 (6th Cir.1992). 
 
                                          IV. 
 
Because no evidence was offered or taken in this matter, the government 
did not meet its burden and the District Court did not discharge its duty 
under Rule 41(e). Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's order 
denying appellant's motion for return of property and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Upon remand, the District Court 
shall determine whether it was proper for the government to surrender the 
1993 Toyota to the repossession company and to destroy appellant's 
business documents. If the District Court concludes that the government's 
actions in either regard were not proper, it shall determine what remedies 
are available.  
 
Inasmuch as Chambers has asserted that he was not provided notice of the 
forfeiture of the 1987 Road Ranger, the District Court shall permit him to 
amend his motion to assert this collateral attack upon the forfeiture. See 
Robinson 
v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S.Ct. 30, 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) (per curiam) 
(an order for forfeiture may be set aside if the manner of notice does not 
comport with due process); United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1999 WL 
198913 (9th Cir. Apr.12, 1999) (constitutionally deficient notice of 
administrative forfeiture renders the forfeiture void); Clymore v. United 
States, 164 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir.1999) (where notice was 
constitutionally deficient and statute of limitations problems exist, 
forfeiture should be vacated and the statute of limitations allowed to 
operate, subject to any available government arguments against it); United 
States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86, 88 (8th Cir.1996) (when an administrative 
forfeiture is void for lack of notice, the forfeiture must be set aside 
and the government ordered to return the property or to commence judicial 
forfeiture in the District Court).  
 Given the complexity of the issues in this matter, the District Court may 
wish to appoint counsel for Chambers upon remand.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
